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The political transition from the authoritarian system to the pluralist regime 
started in December 1976 with the Political Reform Act and finished with the 
approving referenda of Constitution and Statutes, being the first one (December 
1978) general for the State and the second (October 1979) specific for the Basque 
Country. The following stage in both cases was that of starting the previously 
designed institution-building process to result in a third phase that we might define as 
consolidation of the democratic system which is the present one. 
 
The Basque people have been called to polls more than twelve imes since 
the first free elections in 1977. They have voted the composition of the Houses in 
Madrid and Vitoria, of the regional institutions of Alava, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya, of 
the city councils and even of the European Parliament, not to mention the four
referenda. At the regional level, the "inaugural" 1980 election opened a period of 
political alignment and institution-building hegemonized by the PNV (Partido 
Nacionalista Vasco, Basque Nationalist Party) in a context of strong anti-centralist 
mobilization and of maximum activity of the radical nacionalism's armed organisms at 
the same time as ETApm decided its disolution. The second elections of 1984 were 
of "passage", extending the previous situation to a term shortened by PNV's 
parliamentary weakening eventually leading to its early split at the time of defining 
the internal organization of the Basque Country with the LTH as well as its 
alliance-politics. The third 1986 elections were of "realigning" as a result of the 
cataclism caused by PNV's split and the emergence of a new party, EA (Eusko 
Alkartasuna) from which other political forces would profit; for example, the PSOE 
obtains the top parliamentary position and will have to initiate a new political phase of 
coalition. The last elections of 1990 are again "transitional" (1).
 
 
1. EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES  
 
The arrival of liberties with free and competitive elections' summons and 
parties legalization, made possible the public emergence of a rich political pluralism 
which the Basque society had been hatching during the last years of authoritarian 
regime. Some parties (PSOE, PNV, PCE, ANV and the Partido Carlista now socialist 
and favoring workers' selfmanagement) counted already with a centenary existence 
or at least had participated in the last republican experience and shared front, 
government and opposition from the beginning of the civil war. Others, on the 
contrary, emerged with the transformation of dictatorship and shared out the legacy 
both of the regime and of its opposition. 
 
Taking as point of reference the first free elections of June'77 we find already 
a wide plurality of options: the old and the new ones, nationalist and centralist, those 
derived from the regime's political families and those which suffered opposition, those 
connected with political violence and those that rejected it and finally, the right, center 
and left parties (2). 
 
PSOE had to compete with a splinter of its historical sector (PSOE-H) and 
with the legacy of the interior socialism collected by Tierno Galván's PSP which 
would later join it. The PCE competed with communist organizations born from the 
sixties' crisis: ORT, PT, EMK and LKI. The Francoist center-right legacy will find great 
difficulties to organize itself in the Basque Country not being able to compete in all 
provinces; namely UCD and AP do not compete in Guipúzcoa, while some other 
temporary unions appear (GU, DIV or the right-wing FE-JONS and Proveristas). To 
this center- ight block we must add the Christian-democratic opposition agglutinated 
in the FDC whose delegates at the Basque Country will be the DCV later to join in 
the UCD. Lastly, close to the PNV's and ANV's historical nationalism will emerge the 
so-called "abertzale left" organizations which intend to collect the legacy of ETA's 
anti-Francoist fight from the fifties, namely the social-democratic ESB and ESEI, the 
Euskadiko Ezkerra coalition (formed by EIA, EMK, ES, EIC and supported by 
ETA-pm) with a revolutionary marxist trend, and EHAS, at a convergence stage to 
create HASI and LAIA supported by ETA-m and that will not compete electorally until 
HB's creation in 1978. 
 
 
2. PERIODS IN THE CREATION OF THE BASQUE PARTY SYSTEM 
 
The fragility and difficult crystallization of the Basque party system becomes 
clear as soon as we take a backward glance to what has happened since the 
beginning of transition. To better understand its changes we can distinguish four 
periods: (3) the first one (1977-1979) is that of the Basque transition in the strict 
sense; the second (1980-1984), internal institution-building; third (1984-1986) crisis 
of the hegemonic nationalism with PNV's split; and the fourth (1986-1990) is the one 
that opens the phase of democratic consolidation. 
 
 
2.1. 1977-1979: the Basque transition 
 
This period goes from the first general election of 1977 until the regional 
referendum at the end of 1979 in which takes place the first Basque party system's 
main alignments. The celebration of the constitutional referendum (December 1978) 
which adds a conclusive differentiation factor between the Basque parties, takes 
place in these years as well as the second general election (March'79) and the first 




In 1977 nationalism is not majoritarian in the Basque society yet -although 
the PNV is already the first party- and the split within the abertzale left takes place on 
the issue of the reform acceptance. On the other side, the state-wide options emerge 
with relative strength as far as imposing a Socialist president (R. Rubial) at the 
pre-autonomous Consejo General Vasco (Basque General Council) formed by the 
parliamentary parties (PNV, UCD, PSOE and EE). 
 
Besides this phase of pluralism and party- lignment is marked by the 
agreement politics namely the participation of the moderate nationalism in the 
discussion of the constitutional text, although keeping its non-voti g reserve at the 
referendum, the acceptance of amnesty and reform by some of the radical 
nationalists (EE), the pre-autonomic concentration government and the statutory 
consensus just broken by the radical nationalist group that still rejects reform (HB). 
 
The second general elections of March 1979 mean the emergence of the 
nationalist majority as a result both of the decline of the state-wide options and the 
competition of the newborn HB (ASI, ESB and ANV among others) for the first time. 
The provincial and local elections in April will confirm the nationalist hegemony and 
PNV's control of the institutions, proving the weak territorial introduction of the 
state-wide options, specially the center-right wing. This will force the Basque General 
Council's transformation that will be chaired from now on by C. Garaikoetxea. HB 
begins its participation at the polls but at the same time rejects its participation at the 





2.2. 1980-1984: institution-building 
 
This is the period of the first autonomous mandate during which all the 
institutional design begins to concretize not without some strains. It starts after the 
elections of May 1980 (5) that confirm PNV's majority. This party forms the first 
regional government by itself thanks to the majority guaranteed by HB's institutional 
non-participation. Thus this period begins with a nationalist control over all the local 
institutions that will accelerate even more the initial recession of all the state-wide 
options and even UCD's breakdown in the Basque Country. This situation, with the 
PNV competing against the center-right wing at the central government and HB 
contending with all the state-wide left for its space, will succeed -with their 
implantation and imposing their discourse promoting nationalist conflict- in temporally 
demobilizing the non-nationalist electorate (more than 48% of non-voti g in 1980). 
 
The PNV's control over the Basque institutions, a very weakened PSOE and 
an UCD in crisis in Madrid will spoil the first steps of a consociational politics; the 
coup attempt of 23-F in 1981, the Calvo Sotelo government and the new autonomic 
policy stablished by the LOAPA, strongly supported by the rising Socialists, will mean 
a reactivation of nationalist conflict against the state at the height of the regional 
institution building process. 
 
Between 1979 and 1980 the most decisive moment of the diverse terrorist 
organizations' activity takes place, specially that of ETA which sums up to 242 dead 
(a third of the total figure since the beginning of transition). In spite of all we cannot 
forget that in UCD's final period negotiations between the Home Office and ETA-pm 
took place and culminated in this group's disarmament in exchange of the so-called 
"social reintegration policy" which would radicalize and stress relations between HB 
and EE within the Abertzale left. This process will end with the constituent congress 
of Euskadiko Ezkerra, born from the uniting of EIA, PCE/EPK's majoritarian factions, 
a group of HASI's founders and some Socialists from ANV, ESEI and independents 




The Socialist success of 1982 (6) besides opening a new period in Spain 
means a reorientation of the centralist vote in the Basque Country as well as a new 
definition of relations between the Basque institutions and the central government. 
This change will be clear in the second local and provincial elections of 1983 (7) 
which ratify the nationalist hegemony as well as PNV's and EE's rise and PSOE's 
recovery and show a more pluralist panorama specially in the main industrial cities. 
 
Discussion of the regional electoral laws and the postponing of the Ley de 
Territorios Históricos (LTH, Historic Territories Act) -which had to delimit 
competences, between Vitoria's government and the provincial councils- as we l as 
the Ley de Normalización del Euskera (Euskera Standardization Act) or that of 
symbology would open a new front of tensions in the nationalist community at the 
same time as it sharpened the center-periphery conflict. 
 
 
2.3. 1984-1986: the nationalist crisis 
 
The second regional elections (1984) (8) will coincide with a strong dissent 
within the PNV and over the institutional patterns of the Basque autonomous 
community: relations between party and government, representativity and decision- 
making within the party, Arzalluz/Garaikoetxea leadership and the alliances politics 
which opens the crisis in Navarra after th  regional elections of 1983. 
 
We must add to this internal rarified atmosphere -to the point it obliged 
Garaikoetxea to present his proposal of resignation as the candidate to lendakari- the 
violent reaction of ETA's sections that killed the Socialist Senator Casas in the midst 
of the electoral campaign, the first nine murders of GAL and the first deportations and 




  Despite all this the PNV will renew its success in majority terms although 
PSOE's rise and the loss of relevance of HB's institutional non-participation because 
of its relative recession provoke a parliamentary 32-32 draw between Government 
and opposition which will difficult things for the single-colour government and oblige it 
to reach a term-agreement with the PSOE. 
 
Few months after the beginning of this term the internal split of PNV grew 
until Garaikoetxea's resignation from the lendakari's post in 1985 being substituted by 
J.A. Ardanza. The electoral fall of the party in the gen ral election of June 1986 will 
accelerate the rupture in the party and the parliamentary group which culminates in 
the emergence of a new nationalist party led by Garaikoetxea: Eusko Alkartasuna 
(EA). 
 
1986 (9) will perhaps remain in Euskadi's political history as a crucial 
moment and a point of no return within the critical transition through which the 
Basque institutional system is going, whose main symptom is the lack of precise 
delimitation of the composition, electoral outline and ideological distribution of its 
party system. What seems to emerge in this crossroads is the exhaustion of a certain 
policy-making pattern of "adversary politics" (10) featured in this case by conflict 
maximization, constant confrontation, primordialist exclusiveness and the imposition 
of artificial single-party majorities. 
 
 
2.4. 1986-1991: democratic consolidation 
 
This last period begins in November 1986 (11) because of the advancement 
of the third Basque election after PNV's split, and is characterized by a bigger 
segmentation and pluralism in the party-system as a result of the distribution of 
PNV's votes between PNV and EA and of a heavier electoral weight of the nationalist 
left (EE and HB), all this resulting in PSOE's first parliamentary victory.
 
The new party-competition pattern means a total revolution in the Basque 
politics; with the imperious need of coalitions to govern institutions and the essential 
consensus among democratic forces to face the final phase of terrorist activity in a 
political agreement atmosphere. In the first case the search of a parliamentary 
majority culminates in the PNV-PSOE coalition government led by Ardanza; in the 
second, the agreement politics results in the Ajuria-Enea Pact against violence 
signed by all the Basque parliamentary parties (PNV, PSOE, EA, EE, PP and CDS) 
except HB in January 1988. 
 
At the same time the third local and provincial elections of May 1987 extend 
this pluralism to all the institutions, with important territorial differences leading to a 
new EA-EE coalition at the Diputación Foral de Guipúzcoa that matches another 
PNV-PSOE pact in Alava and Vizcaya. 
 
Lastly the fourth regional elections of 1990 define a new picture with the PNV 
being the first party again thanks to the recession of EA and the rest of parliamentary 
parties -with the sole exception of PP, that shows a slight recuperation. Another 
significant fact of these elections is the parliamentary emergence of the old 





3. THE FOURTH REGIONAL ELECTIONS OF 1990 
 
The fourth regional elections can be considered of continuity although they 
do introduce some significative changes that must be taken into account. The 
consolidation phase initiated during the last regional term rests on the recovery of the 
agreement politics in the legislative production, the improvement of relations between 
the democratic parties and relax of their tensions, the great pact legitimating and 
mobilizing against violence, the coalition policy, a larger coordination in the big 
investment plans, and specially the arrival of the economic growth and recuperation 
wave. 
 
The electoral campaign for these elections has been characterized by a 
continuity political discourse and has focused on the several possibilities of the new 
coalition government, in which the PNV always appeared as a constant element, with 
the rest of parties competing for partnership. Except HB's confrontation against all 
the other parties, the programmatic shades and the hand-to-hand fight, essential in 
any campaign, have this time been conspicuously absent: one thing is -to excess- 
the disqualification politics and another - o default- not showing differences too much 
so that the distance to cover in the ensuing negotiations would result shorter. 
 
To ideologize politics means to put it on grand words, symbols and 
orthodoxy, which leads global projects -no matter how far from reality they might be- 
to prevail over means to fulfil them. On the contrary, to depoliticize the public life 
means to shadow differences, emptying them of significance and collective meaning, 
and merely focusing on the instrumental part. We have gone from the extreme of 
ideological excesses -just rethorical many times- to a certain interested 
depoliticization disguised as pragmatism. 
 
A non-voting rate of 39 % has probably been one of the most discussed and 
of largest electoral impact facts of the last regional elections. Its rise of 9 points in 
relation with the results of the elections of four years before has had different 
repercussions on the diverse political forces which probably means that has affected 
some social sectors to a larger extent than others. (See Figure1). 
 
The fact that a 9% of the electoral roll is rejuvenated since 1986 makes us 
see the youngest sector as one of the most affected by this behaviour. At the same 
time, data show that non-voting rates go up to more than 40% in the province 
capitals and most industrial cities where three significative sectors are concentrated: 
workers, immigrants and the new middle classes. 
 
The nationalist parties, representing two thirds of seats and votes, have lost 
about 200,000 votes and 2 seats on the whole; if we take into account that the PNV 
has won about 18,000 votes and HB lost 13,000 we have that nationalist non-voting 
comes specially from the political center (EA has lost 65,000 votes and 4 seats) and 
the moderate left (EE has lost 45,000 votes and 3 seats). Opposite to this, the 
state-wide parties have just lost 6 seats as a result of another 100,000 non-voters, 
half of them PSOE's followers. Nonetheless, the center and right sum up a little more 
than half of the voters and seats and have only lost a third of their total votes with 
different situations, namely: recuperation of votes and seats (+ 5) by PNV and PP 
(wins 4 seats and 28,000 votes at the expense of EA and CDS respectively); the 
curious fact in this block is the success of "alavesismo" as separated of the regional 
right which shows up in the three seats obtained by UA. 
 
Our peculiar parliamentary pluralism -highly fragmented- designs a scene 
formed by seven political forces: four nationalist, two state-wide and one provincialist 
(UA in substitution of CDS); or four on the center and right and three on the left, and 
one anti-system opposite against all the rest. 
 
The fact that none of the parties has the majority -with the first party (PNV) 
representing less than 30% of valid votes and about 17% of the electorate, demands 
a coalition government. The bipartisan PNV- SOE coalition government was the one 
with more probabilit es counting with the parliamentary support of half of the 
Chamber and the confidence of merely 30% of the electoral body or 48% of voters.
 
The PNV is the rising plurality which must assume this government's 
leadership knowing that it is hegemonic within the center- ight and that counts with 
this social sector's economic support but also that it is one of four nationalist options 
and represents just the 43 % of this sector's expressed vote. The PSOE, having lost 
the 20% of its electorate formed specially by workers and immigrants, leads the state 
government and has experience in policy-performing but, just like the PNV, 
represents just the 40% of the votes of a not less dispersed left although it 
agglutinates two thirds of the state-wide parties' vote. 
 
Opposite to them, the opposition, parliamentary or not, should represent the 
other 52% of voters and a wider variety of social sensibilities. 
 
 
3.1. Provincial differences 
 
One of the Basque Country historical and political features is its provincial 
differentiation that is reflected in the party-system and electoral behaviour. This 
became more acute at the 1986 regional and the 1987 local and provincial elections, 
specially by PNV's split and the emergence of EA. In the last elections this fact has 
not changed, specially in Alava by the unexpected success of Unidad Alavesa (UA) 





Participation levels are very similar in the three provinces -around 60%- with 
a fall of a little more than 10 points in Alava and Vizcaya and of 7 points in 
Guipúzcoa, which reaches the higher rate of participation (62.3%). 
 
The nationalist options holding majority in all the provinces, define relative 
positions clearly differentiated. The nationalist vote keeps it highest rate in Guipúzcoa 
(71.6%) with a loss of a little more than 1 point, while in Vizcaya it remains at about 
two thirds (66.4%) with a fall of 0.6 and Alava gets the lowest 50.3% after falling 
more than 8 points. While the PNV recovers voters in the three provinces -with a rise 
of 5.7 points in Vizcaya, 5 in Guipúzcoa and 2 in Alava- the other nationalist parties 
lose, either in a slight and homogeneous way, as HB, or significantly and 
differentiately as EE and EA. EA loses 49 % of its voters in Alava, 40% in Vizcaya 
and even 30% in Guipúzcoa; EE follows a parallel line with a fall of 44 % in Alava, 37 
% in Vizcaya and 33 % in Guipúzcoa. 
 
The center-right recovers majority in Alava (55.2%), with a rise of more than 
5 points, and Vizcaya (52.3 %) increasing 3 points, while the advancement of 1 point 
in Guipúzcoa is not enough to snatch majority from the left, that keeps a 53.6% of the 
votes. Alava's recuperation is due both to EE, PSOE and HB's losses and the net 
balances collected by PP (4 points) and the UA phenom non (11.2% of votes). In 
Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa the PP absorbes CDS' lost: vote while the PNV cannot 
absorb all EA's losses, which reflects that the advancement of the center-right block 
results from the net losses of the left. We must now add to the nationalist options' 
recessions those affecting the PSOE -which loses 14% of its electorate in 
Guipúzcoa, 22% in Vizcaya and 23% in Alava. 
 
 
All these changes produce a differentiated political map for each province. 
This diversity and the electoral fractionalization increase in all the provinces can be 
seen summarized in Map 1. In Alava, the PNV wrenches the first place to the PSOE 
with just one point of distance, followed at some distance by HB, UA and PP which 
move EA and EE from the third and fifth places respectively to the sixth and seventh. 
 
In Guipúzcoa the larger fractionalization between the four main parties 
makes changes draw more attention: HB moves from the second to the first position, 
PNV from the fouth to the second while EA falls from the firs  to the fourth and PSOE, 
EE and PP keep the third, fifth and sixth places respectively. In Vizcaya, however, 
there are no changes at the top, with PNV, PSOE and HB maintaining their positions 
and only EA and EE moving backwards due to PP's rise to the fourth position. What 
is significative in this province is the increase in distance between the PNV and 
PSOE which changes from 6 to more than 14 points while the distance between the 




3.2. Diversity of the Basque electoral geography 
 
We cannot extend ourselves here with a detailed analysis of each province 
and must content with reducing all district data to a vision of the main features of the 
Basque electoral geography, as can be seen in Map 2.
 
We can deduce from the new 1990 regional district map the following 
conclusions: first, the permanence of the electoral ring between the different 
metropolitan areas with mainstays in the industrial- rban and immigration centres 
where non-voting has been proportionally higher (San Sebastián, the industrial area 
of the middle Deba, Oria, Goiherri, Duranguesado, the greater Bilbao, the industrial 
area of the Ayala valley and Vitoria) and where other situations also stand out: high 
electoral fractionalization, political pluralism and change among the dominant 
positions -which on the other side characterize the respective provinces in their 
whole, given this ring's demographic weight. Secondly, it is featured by a majority of 
the nationalist vote, except in Vitoria, and the left-wing options, except in Alava; 
besides, HB gets the top position in the aforementioned districts of Guipúzcoa, the 
PSOE gets it in Vitoria and the PNV in all the rest.
 
As for the changes in the main electorates in relation with 1986 we underline 
the following data from Maps 3 to 9: The PNV recovers majority in Uribecosta, 
obtaining more than 40% in the rest of Vizcaya's districts with the exceptions of 
greater Bilbao and Duranguesado, as well as in the Western Mountains and Valleys 
of Alava; it gets a third of the votes in the rest of Vizcaya, in the Urola of Guipúzcoa 
and the foothills of Gorbea, the Llanada and Rioja of Alava, surpasses the 20% in the 
rest of Guipúzcoa and the Ayala valley and, lastly it positions itself under this rate in 
the metropolitan areas of Vitoria and San Sebastián. 
 
The PSOE obtains its maximum rate of 31 % at the industrial areas of the 
Nervión estuary left bank and surpasses 20% in Bilbao, the industrial area of the high 
Nervión and the greater San Sebastián. 
 
Herri Batasuna gets its best results in Lea-Artibai (35 %) and the middle Oria 
(32%) and surpasses 20% in the other districts of Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya with the 
exceptions of the greater Bilbao and the Encartaciones as well as the Ayala valley 
and foothills of Gorbea in Alava. 
 
Eusko Alkartasuna's best result (24%) is at Urola (Guipúzcoa), getting more 
than 20% in the middle Oria and Goiherri and almost this rate at the Gorbea of Alava 
and the district of Busturia in Vizcaya. 
 
Euskadiko Ezkerra surpasses its provincial means in Goiherri (11%), the 
greater San Sebastián (10%), Bilbao and the estuary banks (8%) and Vitoria (7%). 
 
The best results of the PP are Alava's, surpassing its mean of 11% in Vitoria, 
the Western Valleys, the mountain and Rioja of Alava; in Vizcaya it gets more than 
the mean (9%) in Bilbao and the right bank of the estuary (Getxo) and the greater 
San Sebastián where it also surpasses the mean of Guipúzcoa (7%). 
 
Lastly Unidad Alavesa counted only on the vote of Alava, with a very 
differentiated distribution in the different areas of this province: 15% of the vote in the 
Western valleys and Vitoria, 11% in the Rioja, 7% in the Llanada and the Mountain, 
5% in Gorbea and 1% in the Ayala valley. 
 
Maps 3 to 9 show the district distribution of the main electorates and 
non-voting in 1990. 
 
The nationalist vote as a whole, that surpasses 90% in the coast districts of 
Busturia and Lea-Artibai, does not reach 50% in Vitoria, getting better results in the 
middle Oria, high Deba, Goiherri, Lea and Duranguesado; it keeps the same 
positions in the middle Deba, Urola, Encartaciones, Arratia, Uribe and Busturia and, 
lastly, moves backward in the greater San Sebastián, greater Bilbao and all the 
districts of Alava. The left-wing vote reaches its top rate of 55% in the greater San 
Sebastián and the left bank, surpasses 50% in the high Nervión and all the districts 
of Guipúzcoa except Urola, where it gets over 40% together with the greater Bilbao 
as a whole, Vitoria, Duranguesado, Lea and the Ayala valley; 30% is surpassed in 
the rest of Vizcaya and Alava with the exceptions of the minimum rates of the 
Western valleys (24%) and the mountains of Alava (22%). 
 
 
4. THE PARTY-SYSTEM: FRACTIONALIZATION AND, POLARIZATION 
 
In few issues there exists such a unanimity as in the definition of the Basque 
party-system as "polarized pluralism" (12): a mean of seven principal parties, two 
majoritarian parties that do not reach 49% of the valid vote, a parliamentary 
fractionalization index of 0.81, important ideological tensions and an anti-system 
party (HB) with more than 15% of the votes and which competes to occupy the 
second position with an uncovert support of the violent strategy make a series of 
indicators and dimensions that explain the accuracy of this definition. 
 
Fractionalization would not be specially relevant were it not paralleled by an 
ideological remoteness between the extreme parties that count which affects their 
competition space and also admits different levels and ways of intervention of the 
opposite conception of the social system, the political institutions acceptance or 
rejection or the identities and symbol systems' confrontation, among others. 
 
 
4.1. The Basque fractionalization 
 
One of the first indicators to be analyzed is the number of relevant parties 
either by their coalition or blackmail potential, according to Sartori's criteria. The role 
played by the different Basque parties and the space achieved by each of them after 
a long decade and specially the coalitions and agreements game initiated in the last 
term allow us to assert the relevance of seven parliamentary parties, which is one 





  As we can see in Table 3 despite thec anges that have taken place in the 
internal structure of the Basque party-system, the same high fractionalization level 
remains as one constant feature. Together with it, the parliamentary forces have 
slightly increased its dispersion although without canging its pluralism and at the 
same time not allowing the emergence of majorities, and still less the hegemony of 
any of the parties. 
 
The PNV-PSE coalition government experience has slightly increased the 
parliamentary concentration of the first two parties to the point of reaching majority 
but, at the same time, the fact that this change is the result just of PNV's rise and its 
promotion to the system's first position has paradoxically increased the minor parties' 
relevance up to making realistically possible up to six alternative coalitions: 
PNV-PSOE, PNV-EE-PSOE, PNV-EE-EA, PNV-EE-EA-PP, the more improbable 
PNV-EE-PP and even the transitional minority PNV-EE government. We can see that 
this set of possible coalitions only excludes HB because of its anti-system definition 
and UA which has occupied CDS' place at Parliament and will probably play an 
important role in Alava's institutions after its consolidation in the 1991 provincial and 
local elections. 
 
The PNV, recovered from its 1986 crisis, is the central -if not dominant force 
again, leading the three provincial Diputaciones and most of the country's town 
councils with the support of different coalitions, being the most relevant formula that 
of PNV-PSE (Alava and Vizcaya) with the addition of EE (Basque government) or PP 
(Guipúzcoa). It was precisely the- alliance politics after the local and provincial 
elections and PNV-EA rivalry what provoked the rupture of the ephemeral 
PNV-EA-EE coalition government in Vitoria, with the substitution of EA by the PSE. 
This crisis triggered at the same time EE's internal split which had been hatching 
since the 1990 electoral recession and the division at the IV Congress in 1991. 
 
If we compare the Basque party-system with the Spanish or the rest of 
communities' according to some indicators of their structure we find that: first, its 
seven parliamentary parties put the Laakso and Taagepera's effective party number 
index (13) up to 5.3 which is the highest among all the communities and only 
surpassed by Belgium (6.42) in the whole of the European countries;(14) secondly, 
Rae's parliamentary fractionalization index (15) is also the highest (0.81); thirdly, the 
seats proportion of the first party is the lowest (29%) as well as the addition of the 
first and second (51%) but, lastly, the percentage of seats obtained by the nationalist 
or region-wide parties is nonetheless maximum (71%). 
 
Most of the times these structures have relation with the respective electoral 
law's effects. In the case of the Basque Country these are the following: the 
voters-seats ratio in the largest district is 4.4 times higher than at the smallest -the 
highest among all the Spanish Communities with the exception of Canarias due to its 
insularity; nonetheless the Lijphart's global disproportionality index(16) is 1.3, much 
lower than the Spanish 6.6 and the lowest among all the Autonomous Communities, 
equal to that of Belgium and Sweden and lower than most of European 
countries';(17) finally, the proportion of votes that do not get any representation is of 
5 % which places the Basque country among the six Communities that waste a 
smaller number of votes by the combined effect of disproportion and thresholds. 
 
 
4.2. The Basque polarization 
 
Although we do not have any post-electoral sample data about the pr sent 
positions of parties on the main dimensions of ideological distance we do not think 
there has been any significative change and will use those obtained in our 1987 
polls. We feel that the centripetal trend of most of the electorate and the change of
discourse of and relations between the parliamentary parties, which have seen 
themselves committed to pacts and coalitions during the last term, will have reduced 
the polarization level, but we will be able to see it later and verify the hypothesis that 
this moderation hides behind the higher non-voti g level at the last regional elections. 
 
The space occupied by the parties on the right-left dimension is very similar 
to that of the beginning of the 1980 autonomous process although UCD's 




Table 4 confirms the central position of the PNV, the unstability and duality of 
the state-wide center and right that will not solve the virtual electoral disappearance 
of CDS, EA's center-left ubication between PNV and PSOE which also moderates in 
a centripetal sense as well as the left position occupied by EE, verifying HB's most 
extreme position. PNV's and EE's electorates, with a centripetal movement of 0.4 
appear as the most moderate. 
 
We cannot refer to the independence-c ntralism dimension in relation to the 
1980 election because we lack this indicator but we have that of the 1982 general 
elections in which UCD had already been substituted by CP and CDS. Although 
working at different electoral leve s -regional and state-wide- and shortening the 
evolution time, we can deduce some changes in the ideological polarization of this 




  There still is a distance of 2 points between th  electorates of nationalist 
and state-wide options which is not compensated by the PNV's centripetal 
displacement because this same movement takes place simultaneously at the view 
of the autonomous policy developed by the PSOE in these first years. We could think 
that the experience of the PNV-PSOE coalition government should have reduced that 
distance with a change of trend, more centripetal, but this is just a hypothesis for the 
moment. EE's regionalist position adjusts still more to PNV's, with EA's ubication at 
the open space between this party and HB as it happens with CDS between the 
PSOE and CP. On the contrary, CP and HB keep their extreme positions almost still 
so that their isolation becomes evident, sharpened in the case of HB by its 
anti-system position and its collusion with ETA's violence. 
 
The polarization indexes which result from dividing the distance between the 
extreme parties by the maximum distance possible show us that this feature 
maintains high levels and has even sharpened. 
 
On one side, UCD's disappearance and the right reorganization has 
increased the polarization of the left-right dimension, which recovers some of its lost 
protagonism in front of the other dimension's prevalence. The 
independence-centralism polarization stands at the same time almost untouched by 
the regionalist policy of PSOE since its arrival at government, EA's emergence after 




The space of political competition between the relevant parties is delimitated 
by the aforeanalyzed dimensions and defines the electoral strategy of the different 
parties. If we compare our figures with those studied by J. Linz for 1977, 1979 and 
1980 we can see that the system complexity remains constant and that there still are 
some differences which difficult agreement. Nonetheless, we can observe in Figure 3 
a certain regrouping at the center-left and the moderate nationalism since 1986, as 
well as a larger isolation of the extreme options. This reorientation, partly centripetal, 
has a double effect: on one side it is facilitating the relation between the parties and, 
on the other it seems to augur a greater unstability within the party-system as it 





Lacking the necessary post-electoral sample studies that would allow us to 
measure the changes produced in the last term, the temporal perspective and the 
aforeseen indicators endorse the conclusion of a permanence of the basic constants 
which feature the Basque polarized pluralism. 
 
Although the last regional elections can be defined as "of continuity" we 
cannot ignore the existence of an important electoral unstability background, 
compiled for the moment in the big non-voti g bag. The PNV, euphoric about the 
triumph and its victory over EA's rivalry, must evaluate not without inner tensions the 
results of its political turn and its alliance politics. The PSOE has just closed the 
Damborenea crisis and its short opposition experienc  after an important electoral 
defeat. 
 
HB must keep its anti-system discourse active but also needs some 
moderation to hold off the slow but constant electoral erosion. EA gives up in its fight 
for substituting the PNV at the top of nationalism and sees itself obliged to evaluate 
the results of its turn toward radical nationalism without this meaning that a 
movement towards socialdemocracy would guarantee better results than the 
assumption of the role of necessary complement of the traditional nationalism within 
a Catalan-type coalition. EE faces its fifth Congress and the arrival to the regional 
power in its worse electoral moment and after the split of the so-call d "Auñamendi" 
sector, supporter of a nationalist identity and alignment to create a new natio alist 
and progressive political force together with EA and hypothetical sectors of HB. PP's 
provisional recovery does not close the endemic crises of the state-wide c nter- ight 
in the Basque Country, which must now face another organic outbreak of one of its 
characteristical features, namely the "foralismo" or provincialism, in this case of UA in 
Alava and even UV (Unidad Vizcaína) in Vizcaya. 
 
The phase of political normalization -or consolidation- led by the PNV-PSOE 
coalition from the government andby the EA-EE peripheric but alternative coalition 
from the opposition, and also by the Ajuria-Ene  Pact, has allowed to revitalize the 
left-right axis and has at the same time sharpened the system's centripetal trends. If 
we add to this the shy transformation of the political discourse and the change of the 
governmental scene protagonists we may foresee a background of important 
electoral unstability and thus the absence of definitive crystallization of the 
party-system. 
 
Although we have not directly mentioned the terrorist violence, we cannot 
forget that ETA and the social movement it leads through HB constitute an essential 
actor of the Basque political system whose democratic consolidation will require the 
political defeat and eradication of the violent subculture it has generated, feeding and 
reproducing the social and political segmentation factors. 
 
Government and opposition are the two sides of the same political game. A 
majority that gives its support to government is as necessary as a strong 
parliamentary opposition that controls the power practice, representing its voters, and 
showing the possibilities of alternance in government. They both share the task of 
consolidating the Basque political system, based upon the integration of the diverse 
political subcultures and social sectors generated by the Basque society and whose 
energies' addition will have to make possible the majority unity around a common 
project, fed by the political culture and democracy values.
 
Such a consolidation will allow the Basque society to do the necessary 
transformation to face the challenges of a historic decade: the final exit out from our 
industrial crisis, the impact of the Single Market, Euskad's political ubication in the 
European political union, the end of terrorism as well as the modernisation of our 
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